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Abstract 
States utilise international law to create opportunities within global markets for 
private transnational economic actors, such as multinational oil companies, to invest 
and/or operate within foreign jurisdictions. However, there is a lack of directly 
enforceable international mechanisms against these private actors when they cause 
environmental damage abroad. International law responses to this problem range 
from the establishment of international compulsory compensation schemes, the 
proposed expansion of the doctrine of State responsibility to include liability for 
private actors and more recently, through litigation in the home States of 
multinational oil companies. However, both international jurisprudence and US, 
Dutch and British domestic case law reveal an ambivalence towards holding such 
private transnational economic actors legally accountable in their home State 
jurisdictions for violations committed abroad. Certain States (the USA and France) 
have responded to this ambivalence by reasserting their domestic regulatory powers 
to require immediate clean-up and compensation, prior to domestic judicial litigation, 
whereas other States (Nigeria) are unable to achieve the same level of effective 
enforcement due to their weaker political and economic bargaining positions. 
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This essay explores the continuing legal issues arising from the non-compliance of 
environmental protection standards by private transnational economic actors 
operating beyond the national jurisdiction from which they originate. The focus here 
is on the activities of the multinational oil industry. This species of private 
transnational economic actors is taking advantage of increased opportunities to trade 
and especially, to invest within different national jurisdictions, following the success 
of world-wide efforts at trade liberalization and investment protection, established 
through international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),1 the Energy 
Charter treaty,2 as well as bilateral investment protection treaties (known as BITs). 
States have used international law to intervene within global markets and create 
opportunities for private transnational economic actors, such as multinational oil 
companies, to invest and/or operate within foreign jurisdictions. However, when 
domestic environmental protection standards are not complied with by these private 
actors, the lack of international mechanisms that are directly enforceable against these 
                                                   
1 ICSID is an autonomous international institution established under the Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID or the Washington 
Convention) with more than 140 member States. Accessible at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pag
eName=AboutICSID_Home 
2 The Energy Charter Treaty was adopted on 17 December, 1994 in Lisbon and entered into force in 
April 1998. As of June 2013, 47 States have ratified the Treaty and a further four States have signed but 
not yet ratified it. Part III of the Treaty, including Articles 10-17, covers ‘Investment Promotion and 
Protection’. Accessible at: http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=7&L=0 
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private transnational economic actors means that States have to re-intervene to 
regulate, or otherwise hold these actors accountable for their non-compliance of these 
standards. International law responses to such non-compliance range from the 
establishment of international compulsory compensation schemes, the proposed 
expansion of the doctrine of State responsibility to include liability for private actors 
and more recently, through litigation in the home States of these multinational oil 
companies. However, domestic case law from the USA, Netherlands and the UK 
reveals a general ambivalence towards holding such private transnational economic 
actors accountable in their home State jurisdictions for violations committed abroad.  
Jurisprudence from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) also 
exhibits a reluctance to hold private actors directly accountable to public international 
law.  
 
Certain States (the USA and France) have responded to this ambivalence at the 
international level by reasserting their domestic regulatory power to require 
immediate clean-up and compensation, prior to domestic judicial litigation, whereas 
other States (such as Nigeria) are unable to achieve the same level of effective 
enforcement against the multinational oil companies operating within their 
jurisdictions due to their weaker political and economic bargaining positions. As we 
will see below in the Deepwater Horizon and Erika case studies, international ‘best 
practice’ for the clean-up, remediation and compensation for oil spills were ‘enforced’ 
against the multinational oil companies involved, namely, BP, Shell and Total, even 
prior to any domestic judicial finding of liability. This is in stark contrast to the 
jurisdictional and enforcement difficulties encountered when attempting to ensure 
clean-up and compensation for oil pollution in the Niger Delta region, at least in part 
attributed to omissions by Shell (Nigeria). The relative negotiating strengths of the 
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host State governments involved, namely, the US (Deepwater), France (Erika) and 
Nigeria (Niger Delta) clearly played a part in the different response levels by the 
multinational oil companies implicated in each of these case studies. This disparity is 
especially evident in the pro-active BP and Total responses in the US and France, 
respectively, as compared with the paucity of the Shell response in Nigeria. 
 
Part I of this essay will first outline the different international and domestic legal 
means utilised to render these private transnational economic actors accountable, 
responsible and even liable, for their non-compliance of domestic environmental 
protection standards abroad. The international regimes established for these 
purposes, alongside the ambivalent results of both international case law and domestic 
cases from the USA, Netherlands and UK jurisdictions, will then be assessed. In Part 
II, the legal implications of an altogether more forceful approach taken by certain 
States (the USA and France) against the private transnational economic actors 
involved will be considered. Finally, this paper will conclude by reflecting on the 
viability of the different legal approaches towards rendering private transnational 
economic actors responsible for the environmental damage caused by their activities 
beyond their home State jurisdictions, in light of the forceful regulatory intervention 
that is still available and sometimes utilized by States. 
 
Key to the arguments presented here is the need to recognize both the initial sense of 
legitimate expectation, but also more recently, the notion of social obligation that now 
underpins the legal relationships between private transnational economic actors and 
both the States they originate from and operate within. Previously, this sense of 
legitimate expectation manifested itself in arguments for the recognition of such 
private transnational economic actors as legal persons with enforceable rights against 
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States, especially in the field of investment protection. More recently, the initial sense 
of legitimate expectation of investment protection on the part of these private 
economic actors has also translated into a growing sense of common obligations, 
accountability, and ultimately, even acceptance of responsibility on the part of these 
actors for their actions or omissions, where these do not accord with accepted human 
rights and/or environmental protection standards. However, such acceptance of 
corporate responsibility is usually voluntary on the part of the multinational oil 
company involved, rather than the result of the effective enforcement of these 
international norms within the domestic jurisdictions where these companies operate.  
 
These ground-breaking legal developments are also taking place against a backdrop of 
unprecedented questioning of the role of the State in the political economic sphere 
within which these private transnational economic actors operate. In particular, the 
regulatory and enforcement roles of the State within their municipal and international 
legal frameworks are under scrutiny as never before, even in areas that were 
traditionally within the domain of States. While the regulatory role of the State is being 
questioned, alternative governance frameworks for holding private transnational 
economic actors legally accountable for their activities both at home and abroad have 
not necessarily been effective. Thus, individual States have retained their 
interventionist and regulatory roles over private transnational actors licensed to 
undertake economic activities deemed to be of significant State interest, such as the 
petroleum industry. In these situations, it is the relative strength of the regulatory 
power exerted by the host States that ultimately tips the balance either towards or 





I. International Law Responses to the Challenge of Regulating 
Multinational Oil Companies  
The main obstacle for public international law within this context is ensuring the 
effective implementation and enforcement of human rights and environmental 
protection standards by transnational private economic actors, especially when they 
operate in foreign (host State) jurisdictions, beyond their home State jurisdictions. 
Public international law, normally the domain of States, but increasingly also of inter-
governmental organizations such as the UN, World Bank, IMF and WTO, has 
developed at least two ways to regulate the transnational activities of private economic 
actors, such as these multinational oil companies. First, via the adoption of multi-
layered global and regional normative instruments targeting transnational business 
activities. The adoption of international instruments such as the 2011 UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights3 (hereinafter, Ruggie Principles), the 2008 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, and the 2000 Global Compact4, are all examples of the 
                                                   
3 The UN Human Rights Council endorsed the ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations 'Protect, Respect and Remedy' Framework’ on 16 June 2011. These 
Principles were proposed by the UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, John 
Ruggie, as part of his report to the Council. Accessible from: 
http://www.business-humanrights.org/UNGuidingPrinciplesPortal/Home 
4 Adopted on 26 July 2000, and subject to further iterations and developments on 6 September, 2005 
and 19 February, 2008, respectively, the UN Global Compact is a strategic policy and networking 
initiative for businesses that are committed to aligning their operations and strategies with ten 
universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption. 
Among the ten principles that businesses commit to implementing in their activities, Principle 8 
provides that they ‘undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility.’   
Accessible from http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ 
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normative efforts of international governance institutions such as the UN and OECD 
in this field. These international normative exercises are designed to appeal directly to 
the behaviour of multinational businesses undertaking transnational activities with 
the aim of ensuring their compliance with, inter alia, international human rights and 
environmental protection standards. Notably, these international instruments 
confirm the application of basic human rights and environmental protection 
principles and standards to private transnational economic actors but do not provide 
any international means for enforcing these principles and standards. Indeed, the 
Ruggie Principles, for example, require States to provide access to effective domestic 
judicial and non-judicial remedies addressing business-related human rights abuses.5 
However, the foundational Ruggie Principle on this issue appears to limit access to 
such remedies only to situations ‘… when such abuses occur within their territory 
and/or jurisdiction …’6, thereby arguably negating the possibility of access to domestic 
remedies for abuses committed by businesses abroad. 
 
The second regulatory means utilized in this context is through the institutional 
networks established by the above international organizations both across and within 
national jurisdictions aimed at rendering private economic actors that originate from 
those jurisdictions accountable for their risky human rights and environmental 
practices. These institutionalized accountability networks are beginning to make an 
impact on multinational oil industry activities, especially through the concerted efforts 
of civil society groups utilizing these networks. A recent example of both these 
normative and networking developments is the utilization by Amnesty International 
                                                   
5 See Ruggie Principles 26 & 27, and attached commentaries, op. cit. 
6 See Ruggie Principle 25 and attached commentary, ibid. 
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and Friends of the Earth in January, 2011 of both the OECD National Contact Points 
(NCPs) and the OECD Committee on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises (CIME), as well as the provision of testimony before a Dutch 
parliamentary committee hearing, to highlight the alleged involvement of the Royal 
Dutch Shell oil company in the despoliation of the Niger Delta through its operations 
in that area.7 However, neither of these international and national governance and 
accountability frameworks can ultimately hold such private actors responsible and 
liable for any breach of international human rights and environmental standards in 
their transnational activities. As a recent Chatham House report on oil theft in Nigeria 
observes: ‘In June 2013, an NCP panel in the Netherlands issued a statement 
criticizing Shell for publishing data that exaggerated oil theft’s role as a cause of oil 
spills in the Niger Delta. The statement was a limited victory for environmental 
activists in the region, but had no discernible effect on oil theft proper.’8 
 
The continuing difficulties faced by the alternative international governance 
structures established to render such private transnational economic actors 
accountable for their non-compliance of human rights and environmental norms 
abroad highlights the need for a re-configuration of international law so that it can be 
                                                   
7 See ‘Shell accused over misleading figures on Nigeria oil spills’, Amnesty International, UK Press 
Release on 25 January, 2011, accessible at: http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/shell-accused-
over-misleading-figures-nigeria-oil-spills 
8 See: Christina Katsouris and Aaron Sayne, Nigeria’s Criminal Crude: International Options to 
Combat the Export of Stolen Oil, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) (September, 
2013) 67pp, at 63.  
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directly enforced against such private transnational actors in foreign jurisdictions.9 
Despite evidence of the progressive co-option of private economic actors into 
acceptance of international human rights and environmental protection standards by 
instruments such as the Ruggie Principles, OECD Guidelines and UN Global Compact, 
gaps remain with regard to a crucial aspect of the overall public international law 
system, namely, the responsibility and especially, liability of such private actors, if and 
when they fail in their performance of these co-opted international principles, rules 
and standards. The following sub-sections chart some of the possible pathways 
towards rendering such actors legally accountable, responsible and even liable, for 
their breach of international norms and standards in the human rights and 
environmental protection fields. 
 
A. State intervention establishing compulsory international 
compensation schemes  
A further international law response, within specific fields of economic activity 
deemed to be ultra-hazardous from an environmental perspective, is to establish 
international compensation schemes that extend to cover the activities of non-State, 
private transnational economic actors. Examples of these mechanisms are the 
international civil liability and compensation schemes (established by treaties) for oil 
                                                   
9 David M. Ong, ‘International Law for Environmental Protection’, in Basak Cali (ed.) International 
Law for International Relations, Oxford: OUP (2009) 306-329, at 321-322. 
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spills from tanker shipping,10 and damage from nuclear power generators.11 Under 
these schemes, members of these industries are compelled to contribute towards 
compensation funds that are applicable on a world-wide basis. Focussing on the 
international agreements applying to oil cargo shipments, the first of these is the 1992 
Civil Liability Convention (1992 CLC) which governs the liability of ship owners for oil 
pollution damage. Under this Convention, the registered ship owners incur strict 
liability for pollution damage caused by the escape or discharge of persistent oil from 
their ships. This means that they are liable even in the absence of fault. The 
compensation limits are dependent on the tonnage of the oil tanker ship, with a 
maximum limit of 89,770,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) for ships of 140,000 
gross tonnes or more.12 The International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 1992 
established under the 1992 Fund Convention, which is supplements the 1992 CLC, 
                                                   
10 The International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds are three intergovernmental organizations (the 
1971 Fund, the 1992 Fund and the Supplementary Fund) which provide compensation for oil pollution 
damage resulting from spills of persistent oil from tankers. Further information accessible at: 
http://www.iopcfunds.org/ 
11 The international nuclear civil liability regime was initially embodied in two instruments, i.e. the 
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 1963 and the Paris Convention on Third 
Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 1960, both of these linked by a Joint Protocol adopted 
in 1988. The Paris Convention was later added to by the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention. This 
was followed by the adoption of a 1997 Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability 
for Nuclear Damage, as well as a further Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage. Further information accessible at: 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/liability.html 
12The unit of account in the Conventions is the Special Drawing Right (SDR) as defined by the 




compensates victims when compensation under the 1992 CLC is unavailable or 
inadequate. The 1992 Fund pays compensation when: 
 the damage exceeds the limit of the ship owner’s liability under the 1992 CLC, 
or 
 the ship owner is exempt from liability under the 1992 CLC, or 
 the ship owner is financially incapable of meeting his obligations in full under 
the 1992 CLC and the insurance is insufficient to pay valid compensation 
claims.  
 
The maximum compensation payable by the 1992 Fund is 203 million SDR for 
incidents occurring on or after 1 November 2003, irrespective of the size of the ship. 
For incidents occurring before that date, the maximum amount payable is 135 million 
SDR. These maximum amounts include the sums actually paid by the ship owner 
under the 1992 CLC. The 1992 Fund is financed by contributions levied on any person 
who has received in one calendar year more than 150,000 tonnes of crude oil and/or 
heavy fuel oil (contributing oil) in a Member State of the 1992 Fund.13 The 
Supplementary Fund Protocol, which was adopted in 2003, entered into force in 2005, 
thereby establishing the International Oil Pollution Compensation Supplementary 
Fund, 2003. The Supplementary Fund provides additional compensation beyond the 
amount available under the 1992 Fund Convention in 1992 Fund Member States which 
are also Parties to the Protocol. The total amount available for compensation for each 
incident is 750 million SDR, including the amounts payable under the 1992 
                                                   




Conventions.14 These internationally-managed compensation fund schemes pay out 
on the basis of strict, no-fault requirement liability but with the quid pro quo proviso 
that claims from each incident are subject to strict upper limits on the total amount of 
compensation payable. They are arguably also examples of Ruggie Principle 29, calling 
for business enterprises to establish or participate in effective operational-level 
grievance mechanisms for individuals and communities who may be adversely 
impacted, to make it possible for grievances to be addressed early and remediated 
directly.15 
 
However, even these international civil liability and compensation schemes do not 
engender formal international legal sanctions against the companies undertaking 
these activities. Moreover, the narrow focus of these international civil liability 
schemes should not be overlooked. The international oil spill compensation schemes, 
for example, only cover oil tanker cargo movements using this specific mode of 
transportation. Indeed, an experts workshop held at the Paris Oceanographic Institute 
on 30 March 2012 concluded that ‘the international framework does not 
comprehensively address the safety and liability issues related to offshore oil 
activities.’16  
 
                                                   
14 Information accessed from: http://www.iopcfunds.org/about-us/legal-framework/1992-fund-
convention-and-supplementary-fund-protocol/ 
15 See Ruggie Principle 29 and attached commentary, op. cit. 
16 Julien Richotte, ‘Towards an international regulation of offshore oil exploitation, Report of the experts 
workshop held in Paris Oceanographic Institute on March 30th 2012, IDDRI Working Paper, No.15 
(July, 2012)18pp, at 12. 
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Within the offshore exploration/production sector of the oil industry, one regional 
arrangement that has recently been amended in an Extraordinary General Meeting of 
the contractual parties on 28 October, 2013 to enter into force on 1st January, 2014 is 
the 1975 Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (OPOL). This is not an international 
convention but a private agreement between 16 (oil and gas company) operators in the 
offshore sector, adopted under the auspices of the Offshore Pollution Liability 
Association Ltd.17 OPOL imposes strict liability on operators of offshore facilities and 
guaranteed payment of compensation up to a limit currently set at US$250 million per 
pollution incident. The parties to OPOL are the 16 operators of offshore facilities 
within the jurisdiction of any of the ‘Designated States’ to the Agreement. These 
include the UK, Denmark, Germany, France, Republic of Ireland, Netherlands, 
Norway, Isles of Man, Faroe Islands and Greenland. Cameron, however, observes that 
that this limit is not ‘anywhere near sufficient’18 to tackle large releases of oil, such as 
in the Deepwater Horizon case. Moreover, he notes that although an international 
convention would be the ideal approach for the establishment of a global regime, the 
negotiation and implementation process would take years to complete, which would 
in turn lead to a ‘long time period of uncertainty for operators and contractors, and … 
diverse and unpredictable reactions from some regulatory bodies’.19 
 
                                                   
17 Information on the Agreement and Association is accessible from: 
http://www.opol.org.uk/index.htm 
18 Peter Cameron, Liability for Catastrophic Risk in the Oil and Gas Industry. International Energy Law 
Review, Vol.6 (2012) 207-219, at 211. 
19 Cameron, at 218. 
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B. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea reluctance to expand 
international responsibility 
Such oil spill compensation schemes, whether established by agreements between 
States, or through private, contractual-type liability agreements between 
corporate/industry representatives within each sector/region of the multinational oil 
industry, may prove to be the way forward on these issues. This is especially the case 
when there are continuing indications that both the States themselves and the 
international adjudication bodies they have established are reluctant to fully co-opt 
private actors within the doctrine of international State responsibility and liability for 
breaches of international norms. Instead, they seem to prefer emphasizing the due 
diligence requirement upon States to properly regulate any private economic actors 
that these States may licence/permit, for example, to operate mining activities in the 
deep sea-bed ‘Area’ beyond national jurisdiction.20 Thus, failing to exert sufficient due 
diligence over their licensees’ activities might well result in State responsibility under 
international law, even if the environmental (or other types of) damage is actually 
caused by the private economic actor holding the licence/permit from the State 
concerned, according to a recent Advisory Opinion delivered by the Seabed Disputes 
Chamber of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.21 On the other hand, if a 
                                                   
20 Such activities are regulated under Part XI of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) 
21 See: Responsibilities and Obligations of States sponsoring Persons and Entities with respect to 
Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea, ITLOS Case No.17, rendered: 1 February, 2011. Accessible at: 
http://www.itlos.org. For a comprehensive assessment of the implications of this Advisory Opinion for 
the progressive development of international law, see: Duncan French, ‘From the depths: rich pickings 
of principles of sustainable development and general international law on the ocean floor — the Seabed 
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sponsoring State has done all it can to reasonably discharge its due diligence duties 
vis-à-vis the regulation and supervision of its licensees then no international 
responsibility or liability will occur, despite the fact that damage has been occurred 
within the deep sea-bed Area. In such situations, the Chamber refused to consider 
extending even a residual form of international responsibility or non-fault liability to 
the sponsoring State concerned. Thus, ambiguity on this issue reigns.  
 
While confirming the international responsibility of sponsoring States for ensuring 
that activities in the Area are carried out in conformity with Part XI of the Convention 
under Article 139, paragraph 2, of the Convention;22 the Chamber took the view that, 
‘in order for the sponsoring State’s liability to arise, there must be a causal link between 
the failure of that State and the damage caused by the sponsored contractor.’23 The 
Chamber went on to state that ‘(t)his means that the sponsoring State’s liability arises 
not from a failure of a private entity but rather from its own failure to carry out its own 
responsibilities. In order for the sponsoring State’s liability to arise, it is necessary to 
establish that there is damage and that the damage was a result of the sponsoring 
State’s failure to carry out its responsibilities. Such a causal link cannot be presumed 
and must be proven.’24 After holding that the rules on the liability of sponsoring States 
set out in article 139, paragraph 2, of the 1982 Convention and in the related 
instruments are in line with the rules of customary international law on this issue, the 
                                                   
Disputes Chamber’s 2011 advisory opinion’, International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 26 (4) 
(2011) 525-568. 
22 Para.182 of the Advisory Opinion, ibid. 
23 Para.181, ibid. 
24 Para.184, ibid. 
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Chamber referred to the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State 
Responsibility (hereinafter, ‘ILC Articles’) as follows: ‘Under international law, the 
acts of private entities are not directly attributable to States except where the entity in 
question is empowered to act as a State organ (article 5 of the ILC Articles) or where 
its conduct is acknowledged and adopted by a State as its own (article 11 of the ILC 
Articles). (Thus) …, the liability regime established in Annex III to the Convention and 
related instruments does not provide for the attribution of activities of sponsored 
contractors to sponsoring States.’25  
 
Elaborating on the relationship between the liability of the contractor and of the 
sponsoring State, the Chamber refers to Annex III, article 22, of the 1982 Convention 
and observes that: ‘No reference is made in this provision to the liability of sponsoring 
States. It may therefore be deduced that the main liability for a wrongful act committed 
in the conduct of the contractor’s operations or in the exercise of the Authority’s 
powers and functions rests with the contractor and the Authority, respectively, rather 
than with the sponsoring State. In the view of the Chamber, this reflects the 
distribution of responsibilities for deep seabed mining activities between the 
contractor, the Authority and the sponsoring State.’26 The Chamber then relies on its 
interpretation of the above provision and the ILC Articles to deny the possible 
application of joint and several liability as between the sponsoring State and its 
contractors,27 noting instead that ‘the liability of the sponsoring State arises from its 
                                                   
25 Para.182, ibid. 
26 Para.200, ibid. 
27 Para.201, ibid. According to the Chamber, the notion of joint and several liability arises where 
different entities have contributed to the same damage so that full reparation can be claimed from all 
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own failure to carry out its responsibilities, whereas the contractor’s liability arises 
from its own non-compliance. Both forms of liability exist in parallel. There is only one 
point of connection, namely, that the liability of the sponsoring State depends upon 
the damage resulting from activities or omissions of the sponsored contractor (see 
paragraph 181). But, in the view of the Chamber, this is merely a trigger mechanism. 
Such damage is not, however, automatically attributable to the sponsoring State.’28 
Indeed, in the view of the Chamber, if the contractor has paid the actual amount of 
damage, as required under Annex III, article 22, of the Convention, then there would 
be no room for reparation by the sponsoring State.29  
 
However, the Chamber also accepted that: ‘(t)he situation becomes more complex if 
the contractor has not covered the damage fully. It was pointed out in the proceedings 
that a gap in liability may occur if, notwithstanding the fact that the sponsoring State 
has taken all necessary and appropriate measures, the sponsored contractor has 
caused damage and is unable to meet its liability in full. It was further pointed out that 
a gap in liability may also occur if the sponsoring State failed to meet its obligations 
but that failure is not causally linked to the damage, …’30 This raised the issue of 
whether the sponsoring State has ‘a residual liability, that is, the liability to cover the 
damage not covered by the sponsored contractor’, on which the Chamber noted, opinio 
juris among States was divided.31 In the view of the Chamber, ‘the liability regime 
                                                   
or any of them, but the Chamber then asserts that this is not the case under the liability regime 
established in article 139, paragraph 2, of the Convention. 
28 Para.201, ibid. 
29 Para.202, ibid. 
30 Para.203, ibid. 
31 Para.203, ibid. 
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established by article 139 of the Convention and in related instruments leaves no room 
for residual liability. As outlined in paragraph 201, the liability of the sponsoring State 
and the liability of the sponsored contractor exist in parallel. The liability of the 
sponsoring State arises from its own failure to comply with its responsibilities under 
the Convention and related instruments. The liability of the sponsored contractor 
arises from its failure to comply with its obligations under its contract and its 
undertakings thereunder. As has been established, the liability of the sponsoring State 
depends on the occurrence of damage resulting from the failure of the sponsored 
contractor. However, as noted in paragraph 182, this does not make the sponsoring 
State responsible for the damage caused by the sponsored contractor.’32 Thus, in 
situations where a contractor does not meet its liability in full while the sponsoring 
State is not liable under the Convention, the Chamber was of the view that the 
Authority may wish to consider the establishment of a trust fund to compensate for 
the damage not covered, drawing attention to article 235, paragraph 3, of the 
Convention which refers to such possibility.33  
 
Apart from assessing the applicability of the Conventional rules on attribution of 
liability for damage to the deep sea-bed Area, the Chamber goes on to examine the 
general international law applicable to such situations, observing that: ‘In the event 
that no causal link pertaining to the failure of the sponsoring States to carry out their 
responsibilities and the damage caused can be established, the question arises whether 
they may nevertheless be held liable under the customary international law rules on 
                                                   
32 Para. 204, ibid. 
33 Para.205, ibid. 
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State responsibility.’34 The Chamber then moved to consider whether customary 
international law may be used to fill the gap in the deep seabed liability regime 
established in Part XI of the Convention and related instruments, noting that Articles 
139, paragraph 2, first sentence, and 304 of the Convention state that their provisions 
are ‘without prejudice’ to the rules of international law.35 After further noting that the 
efforts made by the ILC to address the issue of damages resulting from acts not 
prohibited under international law have not yet resulted in provisions entailing State 
liability for lawful acts, the Chamber again draws the attention of the Authority to the 
option of establishing a trust fund to cover such damages not covered otherwise.36 It 
will not have gone unnoticed that the solution mooted by the Chamber here is 
conceptually and practically similar to that which is already in place for tanker oil spill 
pollution compensation and liability for nuclear power generation accidents. While the 
Chamber does not elaborate on which of the entities concerned – whether the 
sponsoring States, or their licensees, or both – should contribute towards this trust 
fund, this option does allow for the possibility that the private economic actors 
undertaking deep sea-bed activities will be included within the proposed trust fund. 
These private economic actors will thus be captured by public international law in line 
with the risks their activities pose to the fragile deep sea-bed environment that is 
subject to the ‘common heritage of mankind’ principle. 
 
C. Litigation by Niger Delta Communities before Domestic US, 
Netherlands and UK Courts 
                                                   
34 Para.183, ibid. 
35 Para.208, ibid. 
36 Para.209, ibid. 
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A further legal response to the alleged damage caused by the overseas activity of 
multinational oil companies is aimed at rendering them accountable before the 
domestic courts of their own, home jurisdictions rather than through the application 
of international regimes. Traditionally, the main legal obstacles to such litigation by 
alleged victims of multinational oil companies operating abroad before the domestic 
courts of the home jurisdiction of these companies are two-fold: First, there is a 
presumption under international law against the extra-territorial exercise of 
jurisdiction by domestic courts, also known as the forum non conveniens rule that 
normally prevents them from adjudicating on claims that arise from foreign 
jurisdictions. Second, there is the company law doctrine of the ‘corporate veil’ which 
provides that the liability of a subsidiary company should not be visited upon the 
parent company of that subsidiary, especially when the parent company is resident in 
a different national jurisdiction. Both these doctrines continue to present difficulties 
for attempts to enforce accountability for multinational oil company activities within 
foreign jurisdictions. It should also be noted that even if/when the extra-territorial 
jurisdiction and corporate veil issues are overcome, any municipal court decisions in 
the home State jurisdictions of the parent company must be accepted by the local 
courts in the jurisdictions of the subsidiary company for enforcement against them. 
 
Three recent cases within different domestic jurisdictions, namely, the USA, the 
Netherlands and the UK, serve to focus attention on these continuing legal issues 
arising from activities conducted by multinational oil companies operating beyond 
their home jurisdictions. In each of these cases, representative individuals or groups 
from Niger Delta communities claimed compensation from the Shell oil multinational 
corporate group. The analytical arrangement of these cases reflects first, the upholding 
in Kiobel v Royal Dutch (Shell) Petroleum of the presumption against the extra-
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territorial application of the US federal Alien Torts Statute (ATS) by the US Supreme 
Court. This is followed by the Akpan v Royal Dutch Shell & Shell Nigeria case, where 
a Dutch municipal court set aside the presumption against extra-territorial 
jurisdiction to hold the Nigerian subsidiary company of Shell liable under the common 
law tort of negligence but declined to lift the corporate veil and implicate the Royal 
Dutch Shell parent company (in the Netherlands) for this breach of a duty of care 
amounting to negligence by its Nigerian subsidiary. Finally, continuing litigation in 
the Bodo Community and Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) of Nigeria 
(Shell Nigeria) case confirms the extra-territorial application of Nigerian law by the 
High Court in the UK to adjuciate claims of tortious liability against SPDC/Shell 
Nigeria but has not yet yielded a final decision on total damages and costs.  
 
In the first of these cases, namely, the US Supreme Court decision in the Kiobel v Royal 
Dutch (Shell) Petroleum Co. on 17 April 2013,37 the plaintiff(s) from the Ogoniland 
region in Nigeria alleged that the multinational corporate defendant (Royal Dutch 
Shell), which also has major operations in the US, aided and abetted human rights 
abuses by the Nigerian government. However, the Supreme Court ruled against the 
extra-territorial application of the 1789 US Alien Torts Statute (ATS) and disallowed 
liability claims against the US-based corporate entities of Shell to the SPDC/Shell 
Nigeria.38 As Wuerth succinctly observes, ‘(o)n the facts of the case - the relevant 
conduct took place within the territory of a foreign sovereign, the claims did not “touch 
and concern” U.S. territory, and the foreign defendants had no more than a “corporate 
presence” in the United States - the Court held that the presumption was not 
                                                   
37 US Supreme Court, 133 (US) S.Ct. 1659 (2013) 17 April, 2013. 
38 Ibid., at 1668-69. 
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overcome.’39 Thus, ‘the Court was unanimous in deciding that the claims lacked 
sufficient connection with the United States.’40 While the Supreme Court decision in 
Kiobel confirming the lack 0f extra-territorial application of the ATS to claims 
originating from Nigeria cannot be directly compared with the Netherlands municipal 
court decision of Akpan v Royal Dutch Shell & SPDC/Shell Nigeria rendered on 30 
January, 2013 in The Hague, Netherlands,41 they are linked together by the original 
nationalities of the claimants (Nigeria) and the corporate defendants (Royal 
Dutch/Shell multinational group) in both cases. 
 
The Akpan case, which will be covered in more detail here due to its relative lack of 
publicity, was initially brought against both the parent Royal Dutch Shell company, as 
well as its subsidiary in Nigeria - SPDC/Shell Nigeria, for its neglect of an oil spill that 
caused damage to adjoining farm land and fishing ponds in the Niger Delta region. 
According to Bekker, this lawsuit was the first time a Dutch multinational company 
has been sued before a civil court in the Netherlands for allegations of pollution 
                                                   
39 Ingrid Wuerth, ‘Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort Statute’, 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 107, No. 3 (July, 2013) 601-621, at 603. 
40 Ibid. 
41 LJN: BY9854, Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage , C/09/337050/HA ZA 09-1580,  






damage caused by its subsidiary company abroad.42 In the Akpan case, Nigerian 
farmers and fishermen victims from the neighbouring villages of Goi, Oruma and Ikot 
Ada Udo, lost their livelihoods when a leaking SPDC oil wellhead polluted their fields 
and fishing ponds. The (representative) individual claimant, Akpan is a Nigerian 
farmer and fisherman who supported himself by exploiting land and fish ponds near 
Ikot Ada Udo in Akwa Ibom State in Nigeria. He was supported in his claim by 
Vereniging Milieudefensie, a Dutch NGO, ‘whose objective is the worldwide promotion 
of environmental care.’43 The joint claims of Akpan and Milieudefensie relate to two 
specific oil spills in 2006 and 2007 from an oil well, the wellhead of which was capped 
above ground but tampered with, causing the two spills. Following some initial 
remedial work in 2007, the wellhead was finally sealed off against sabotage by means 
of a concrete plug.44 The joint plaintiffs brought claims against both the Royal Dutch 
Shell plc parent company and the SPDC/Shell Nigerian subsidiary before a court in 
The Hague, Netherlands, inter alia, claiming compensation and an order for SPDC to 
clean-up the remaining oil contamination. In response, SPDC/Royal Dutch Shell 
contested the jurisdiction of the Dutch courts to adjudicate on the above issues, 
requested that the court declare that it has no jurisdiction over the claims against the 
SPDC and moreover, that the plaintiffs were abusing the relevant Dutch law by 
initiating proceedings against Royal Dutch Shell, the parent company of SPDC/Shell 
Nigeria. A further legal issue concerned the standing of the Dutch NGO as a joint 
                                                   
42 See: Pieter Bekker, ‘Landmark ruling by Dutch court against Shell Nigeria’, Centre for Energy, 
Petroleum, and Mineral Law and Policy (CEPMLP), University of Dundee. Accessible from CEPMLP 
Gateway website at: http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/index.php?news=32271 
43 Akpan v Royal Dutch Shell plc/SPDC (Nigeria) op. cit., at para.2.4 (unofficial English translation) 
44 Para.2.11 of Akpan (2014) ibid. 
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plaintiff, alongside Akpan as a representative claimant from the affected Nigerian 
communities, in relation to the claims for environmental damage in Nigeria. 
 
The Akpan v Royal Dutch Shell/SPDC decision thus confirms the jurisdictional, 
corporate veil and domestic legal enforcement challenges referred to above when 
attempting to invoke liability against the Netherlands-based, Royal Dutch Shell parent 
company for the activities of its subsidiary company – SPDC, based in Nigeria.45 The 
jurisdictional challenge alluded to here relates to the difficulty that bringing an extra-
territorial claim presents for most national legal systems around the world. On the 
other hand, an amicus curiae submission by a group of Dutch international lawyers to 
the Kiobel v Royal Dutch Shell case before the US Supreme Court concluded as 
follows: ‘Dutch case law is therefore incompatible with any alleged rule of customary 
international law prohibiting the exercise of jurisdiction by domestic courts over 
claims such as those pursued by the Petitioners here. To the contrary, recent Dutch 
case law suggests that such claims are indeed recognized by the courts.’46 The collective 
                                                   
45 The parent-subsidiary corporate relationship was described by The Hague court as follows: 
‘Defendants SPDC and RDS are legal entities that are part of the Shell Group. RDS is headquartered in 
The Hague (Netherlands); since 20 July 2005, it has been at the head of the Shell Group. Through 
subsidiaries, RDS holds all shares in its sub-subsidiary, SPDC. SPDC is the Nigerian legal entity that 
conducts the oil production operations in Nigeria for the Shell Group.’, para.2.2. of Akpan (2014) op. 
cit. 
46 Brief of Professor Alex-Geert Castermans (Leiden University), Professor Cees Van Dam (Utrecht 
University), Dr. Liesbeth Enneking (Utrecht University), Dr. Nicola Jägers (Tilburg University), 
Professor Menno Kamminga (Maastricht University), as Amici Curiae in support of the Petitioners, 




view of these Dutch University academics was confirmed in the Akpan case.  In a 
significant interlocutory judgment on its jurisdiction on 24 February 2010,47 The 
Hague district court unequivocally affirmed that ‘the forum non conveniens restriction 
no longer plays any role in today’s private international law.’48 Moreover, The Hague 
district court found that it had jurisdiction over the claims against both corporate 
defendants, namely, the Shell subsidiary in Nigeria, and the Shell parent company in 
The Netherlands, because of the close connection between both these entities, such 
that a joint hearing was justified for reasons of efficiency.49 The Dutch court therefore 
dismissed Shell’s arguments, concluding that it had jurisdiction over both SPDC and 
Royal Dutch Shell on these matters.50 In passing, it should be noted that the court, and 
indeed the relevant Dutch and EU laws that it based its decision on jurisdiction in this 
case, may be said to be fulfilling Ruggie Principle 26, which calls for consideration of 
ways to reduce legal, practical and other relevant barriers that could lead to a denial of 
access to effective domestic judicial remedies for addressing business-related human 
rights abuses. 
 
Following this determination on its jurisdiction, The Hague court then ruled that the 
applicable law in these proceedings would be Nigerian law,51 noting in passing that 
                                                   
http://www.nipr-online.eu/upload/documents/20120820T040709-
Dutch%20legal%20scholars%20Kiobel%20amicus%20brief.pdf 
47 LJN BM1469, accessible at: http://www.rechtspraak.nl 
48 Akpan v Royal Dutch Shell plc/SPDC (Nigeria) op. cit., at para.4.6 (unofficial English translation) 
49 Ibid., at para.4.1. 
50 Ibid., at para.4.7. 
51 Ibid., at para.4.9. 
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Nigerian law is a common law system based on English law.52 the court had previously 
observed that ‘… under certain circumstances, based on Nigerian law, the parent 
company of a subsidiary may be liable based on the tort of negligence against people 
who suffered damage as a result of the activities of that (sub-) subsidiary.’53 Next, the 
admissibility of Milieudefensie’s claims against the RDS and SPDC/Shell Nigeria as a 
separate claimant were considered. Here, the court held that Milieudefensie’s claims 
clearly rose above the individual interests of Akpan, and that remediating the soil, 
cleaning up the fish ponds, purifying the water sources and preparing an adequate 
contingency plan for future responses to oil spills – if ordered – would benefit not only 
Akpan, but the rest of the community and the environment in the vicinity of Ikot Ada 
Udo, as well.54 Moreover, the court considered that Milieudefensie’s campaigns aimed 
at stopping environmental pollution in the production of oil in Nigeria were designed 
to promote the environmental interests in Nigeria.55 Finally, the court held that such 
local environmental damage abroad would fall within the description of 
Milieudefensie’s objective in its articles of association, i.e., to promote environmental 
protection worldwide.56 
 
However, while the court initially ruled in favour of the admissibility of the Dutch 
NGO’s claims to defend environmental interests in Nigeria before the courts in the 
Netherlands,57 it ultimately rejected the Dutch NGO’s claims in substance because oil 
                                                   
52 Ibid., at para.4.10. 
53 Ibid., at para.4.3. 
54 Ibid., at para.4.11. 
55 Ibid., at para.4.12. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., at para.4.14. 
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pollution in Nigeria does not directly affect Milieudefensie’s interests and did not give 
rise to an actionable claim by the Dutch environmental NGO based in Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands under Nigerian law. The fact that under the relevant Dutch law,  
Milieudefensie can protect the interests of third parties in law does not mean that any 
damage of those third parties can be considered to be damage to Milieudefensie 
itself.58 The Hague court further noted that under Nigerian common law, there was no 
proximity between SPDC in Nigeria and Milieudefensie in Amsterdam for any damage 
that occurred in Nigeria near Ikot Ada Udo. Thus, Shell et al had not violated any duty 
of care in respect of Milieudefensie and the court dismissed the claims by and for 
Milieudefensie.59 
 
Moving onto the issue of Royal Dutch Shell (RDS) parent company liability for its 
subsidiary, SPDC/Shell Nigeria, in its final rulings of 30 January 2013, the court 
dismissed all claims against the parent company – RDS, because under Nigerian law 
a parent company in principle is not obligated to prevent its subsidiaries from injuring 
third parties abroad and in the present case there were no special reasons to deviate 
from the general rule.60 Specifically, Milieudefensie had argued that by making the 
prevention of environmental damage as a result of the activities of its operating 
companies – including SPDC in Nigeria – a key objective of its well-publicized overall 
corporate policy, RDS had assumed a duty of care regarding the manner in which 
SPDC’s oil operations in Nigeria are conducted. In this regard, the RDS-SPDC/Shell 
Nigeria, parent-subsidiary, corporate relationship was compared with that in the 
                                                   
58 Ibid., at para.4.35. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Bekker op. cit., referring to para.4.26 of the Judgment. 
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Chandler v Cape plc case before the UK Court of Appeal.61 However, The Hague court 
found that ‘the special relation or proximity between a parent company and the 
employees of its subsidiary that operates in the same country cannot be unreservedly 
equated with the proximity between the parent company of an international group of 
oil companies and the people living in the vicinity of oil pipelines and oil facilities of 
its (sub-) subsidiaries in other countries.’62 Moreover, ‘the duty of care of a parent 
company in respect of the employees of a subsidiary that operates in the same country 
further only comprises a relatively limited group of people, whereas a possible duty of 
care of a parent company of an international group of oil companies in respect of the 
people living in the vicinity of oil pipelines and oil facilities of (sub-) subsidiaries would 
create a duty of care in respect of a virtually unlimited group of people in many 
countries.’63 Thus, The Hague court held that a similar duty of care to that which was 
found by the UK Court of Appeal in Chandler could not be as reasonably, fairly and 
justly found in relation to RDS and SPDC/Shell Nigeria.64 The Royal Dutch Shell group 
of (parent) companies was therefore effectively absolved from the liability of its 
Nigerian-based subsidiary - SPDC/Shell Nigeria - for its lack of effective action to 
prevent oil spill damage from wellhead leaks resulting from sabotage by third 
persons.65 
 
                                                   
61 Ibid., at para.4.27; see Chandler v Cape plc, CA [2012] EWCA Civ 525, on appeal from the High Court 
of Justice (Queens Bench Division) Wyn Williams J [2011] EWHC 951 (QB) 
62 Ibid., at para.4.29. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., at para.4.34. 
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On the other hand, The Hague court held that it was fair, just and reasonable to rule 
that SPDC had a specific duty of care in respect of the people living in the vicinity of 
the oil wellhead, especially fishermen and farmers like Akpan, to take reasonable 
security measures against sabotage.66 As an operator acting reasonably, SPDC could 
have properly secured the oil wellhead at relatively low cost, which would in turn have 
considerably reduced the risk of sabotage. This lead the court to the conclusion that in 
this specific case, SPDC had violated its duty of care in respect of Akpan and 
committed a specific tort of negligence.67 As there was a causal link between the 
violation of this specific duty of care by SPDC and the damage suffered by Akpan, 
SPDC was liable to pay Akpan compensation for this damage.68 However, this ruling 
then raises the enforcement issue noted above. A continuing legal question is whether 
this municipal Dutch court decision on liability and compensation against the 
SPDC/Shell Nigeria can be enforced and complied with in Nigeria, especially given the 
lack of compliance by SPDC to domestic Nigerian court decisions in other Niger Delta 
cases of a similar nature in the past.69   
 
Turning to the third domestic jurisdiction in which similar lawsuits have been brought 
by representatives of local Nigerian communities against SPDC/Shell Nigeria; in The 
                                                   
66 Ibid., at para.4.44. 
67 Ibid., at para.4.45. 
68 Ibid. 
69 See: Corporate liability in a new setting: Shell and the changing legal landscape for the 
multinational oil industry in the Niger Delta, especially Appendix II: Remedying Oil Spills in the Niger 
Delta: Elements for Assessing Responsibility, Report of the Essex Business and Human Rights Project, 




Bodo Community v The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd., 
representatives of the community brought claims before the UK High Court, on behalf 
of some 15,000 or more Nigerians living in the neighbouring Bodo and Gokana areas.70 
These claims for compensation were initially lodged against both RDS and SPDC/Shell 
Nigeria for oil spills that have polluted the creek, rivers and waterways as well as the 
mangrove areas in the Bodo region. The damage is estimated to have affected an area 
of 20 km2 in the Gokana Local Government Area of Rivers State in Nigeria. SPDC has 
admitted liability for damage resulting from two major oil spills in 2008/9, in 
particular to the waterways used by this fishing community in the Niger Delta. The 
amount of oil spilt is estimated to be as large as the spill following the Exxon Valdez 
disaster in Alaska in 1989 and the amount of coastline affected is said to be equivalent 
to the damage done following the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of 
Mexico in 2010 (c0nsidered below). However, this admission of liability is currently 
subject to further litigation over the full extent of the oil spillages and their timing.71   
 
Proceedings against RDS and SPDC began in the UK High Court on 6 April, 2011. 
However, in August 2011, Shell was reported to have accepted legal responsibility for 
the two spills, stating, inter alia, that: ‘SPDC accepts responsibility under the Oil 
Pipelines Act for the two oil spills both of which were due to equipment failure. SPDC 
acknowledges that it is liable to pay compensation - to those who are entitled to receive 
                                                   
70 ‘Particulars of Claim’, Claim No. HQ11X01280, in the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, 
23 March, 2012.  




such compensation.’72 In an agreement between the parties, SPDC has agreed to 
formally accept liability and concede to the jurisdiction of the UK courts, which means 
that the claim against RDS, the parent company of SPDC in Nigeria, has ceased.73  
 
In the subsequent High Court adjudication on the extent of SPDC liability, a similar 
legal finding to the duty to prevent possible sabotage of the oil wellhead that was held 
by the Dutch court in the Akpan case has also emerged in the Bodo Community 
litigation before the UK High Court. This relates to the extent to which the word 
‘protect’ in the relevant Nigerian legislation (Section 11(5)(b) of the Oil Pipelines Act, 
1990) involves an additional obligation to that of ‘maintain or repair’ the pipeline 
concerned. As Akenhead J held, ‘The real issue revolves around whether the required 
protection gives rise to any liability separate to the maintenance and repair obligation, 
and, if so, how far the scope of protection goes.’74 He goes on to state that: ‘Whilst I do 
not consider that the word “protect” is exactly and necessarily synonymous with 
maintenance or repair (of a pipeline), logic suggests that they may well overlap in 
practice; … the usual definitions (of ‘protect’) can be seen to be closer to shielding from 
danger, injury or change and keeping safe and taking care of. … (I)t is my judgment 
that the protection requirement within Section 11(5)(b) involves a general shielding 
                                                   
72 See John Vidal, ‘Shell accepts liability for two oil spills in Nigeria’, Wednesday 3 August 2011. 
Accessed from The Guardian newspaper (UK) website, at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/aug/03/shell-liability-oil-spills-
nigeria?INTCMP=SRCH 
73 See: Shell accepts responsibility for oil spill in Nigeria, 3 August 2011, Accessed from:   
http://www.leighday.co.uk/News/2011/August-2011/Shell-accepts-responsibility-for-oil-spill-in-Nige 
74 [2014] EWHC 1973 (TCC) 20 June, 2014, per Akenhead J., at para.92. 
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and caring obligation.75 He then concludes that: ‘… neglect by the licensee in the 
protection of the pipeline (as defined above) which can be proved to be the enabling 
cause of preventable damage to the pipeline by people illegally engaged in bunkering 
which causes spillage could give rise to a liability; …’76 Thus, in both these cases – 
Akpan before The Hague court, based on the common law tort of negligence & Bodo 
before the High Court, based on interpretation of the relevant statue – it has been 
determined that it is the failure to protect/prevent the relevant oil wellhead/pipeline 
from acts of sabotage that cause oil spill damage that can give rise to liability on the 




II. State Re-intervention to Ensure Appropriate Corporate Responses to 
Oil Spills: International ‘Best Practice’?  
Having outlined and assessed the legal challenges faced at both international and 
domestic jurisdiction levels in relation to asserting accountability for multinationmal 
oil companies operating on foreign jurisdictions, this next Part of this study will 
provide two examples of (host) State-induced corporate responses to oil spill clean-up, 
remediation and compensation. Significantly, these State ‘enforcement’ actions 
against two different, so-called ‘super major’ multinational oil companies took place 
prior to the ultimate domestic judicial decisions on their corporate liability for these 
major oil spills. These two examples: the BP/US and Total/French/EU responses to 
                                                   
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., at para.93. 
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the Deepwater Horizon and Erika oil spills, respectively, arguably represent 
international ‘best practice’ in this field. They are detailed here as follows: 
 
A. Deepwater Horizon/Macondo offshore oil well spill (BP/US)  
Following the Gulf of Mexico Deepwater Horizon/Macondo offshore oil well disaster 
on 20 April 2010,77 the Obama Presidential Administration, through the US Coast 
Guard, and without in any way relieving other responsible parties of liability, directed 
British Petroleum (BP) as the designated operator of the well, to establish a single 
claims facility for all Responsible Parties to centralize claims processing for claimants. 
As an initial response to its acceptance corporate responsibility and liability, BP 
announced on June 16, 2010, that it would create a USD$20 billion escrow account to 
satisfy claims resolved by the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF) and certain other 
claims, including natural resource damages. BP established an irrevocable Trust (for 
the announced escrow account) on August 6, 2010, designating three trustees with 
fiduciary responsibility to collect promised contributions from BP and make 
disbursements to permitted categories of beneficiaries. It committed BP to fund the 
                                                   
77 On 20 April 2010, an explosion on an ultra deepwater semi submersible offshore rig, the ‘Deepwater 
Horizon’ killed 11 crewmen and ignited a fireball seen 56 kilometres (35 miles) from the explosion. After 
36 hours of burning, the rig sank on 22 April, leaving the Macondo well it had drilled in the Gulf of 
Mexico gushing onto the ocean bed and causing the largest offshore oil spill in the history of the United 
States. The spillage continued for 152 days until 19 September 2010, when BP confirmed the completion 
of cementing operations to prevent further oil from spilling from the Macondo Prospect well to which 
the Deepwater Horizon was attached when it exploded. The Deepwater Horizon was leased by BP 
America Production Company (BP) as part of the Macondo project. For an initial discussion of the 
liability issues arising from this disaster, see Ruwantissa Abeyratne, ‘The Deepwater Horizon Disaster 
- Some Liability Issues’, 35 Tulane Maritime Law Journal (Winter, 2010) 125. 
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Trust on a quarterly basis over three and a half years for a total of USD$20 billion to 
be paid into the Trust until 2014. The funding schedule for the escrow account agreed 
to by the administration and BP was for contributions by BP of $5 billon a year for 4 
years. BP later confirmed that the funding schedule would include an initial deposit of 
$3 billion, which was made on August 9, 2010, with an additional deposit of $2 billion 
in the fourth quarter of 2010 and $1.25 billion a quarter until the entire $20 billion 
has been deposited.  The Trust is to pay some OPA-compensable claims (under the US 
federal Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990) and some other claims for personal injuries 
that are not OPA-compensable, but for which BP would be liable under other US 
federal or state laws, such as the Jones Act or state oil pollution acts. Under Section 
1002 of OPA, 1990 each person responsible for a vessel or a facility from which oil is 
discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or up on 
the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable 
for the removal costs and damages. BP established the GCCF to provide a mechanism 
for individuals and businesses to file claims for costs and damages incurred as a result 
of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Under the OPA 1990, these claims can cover 
damage to natural resources, including clean-up and remediation costs for wildlife 
habitats and ecosystems.78 The GCCF began operations and started accepting claim 
forms on August 23, 2010. The GCCF, administered by Kenneth R. Feinberg, draws 
funds from the Trust to pay claims.79 
                                                   
78 33 U.S.C. para.2701(20) & para.2702(b)(2)(A). 
79 Based on information drawn from the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
Study/Report on Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Preliminary Assessment of Federal Financial Risks and 
Cost Reimbursement and Notification Policies and Procedures, GAO-11-90R Oil Spill Liability Trust 





Thus, liability for the damage caused is being enforced at the domestic US (federal and 
state) jurisdictional level. Indeed, as noted above, BP has already been subjected to 
unprecedented US federal government fines totalling US$4.5 billion.80 BP is facing 
further, multiple US state and local government, as well as civil liability compensation 
claims from individuals who suffered damage from the oil spill. Indeed, no sooner had 
BP agreed to the record US federal government fine, when the (US) state governments 
of Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida and most recently, Texas made separate 
claims amounting to a further US$34 billion in total.81  
 
This swift admission of BP’s overall corporate responsibility,82 coupled with its 
advance acceptance of an initial multi-billion US dollar liability for the Deepwater 
                                                   
80 BP's total of $4.5 billion in federal penalties includes $2.4 billion for the National Fish and Wildlife 
Foundation, a $1.256 billion criminal fine and $350 million for the National Academy of Sciences - all 
payable over five years - and a $525 million civil penalty to the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
See Reuters (UK) news agency report, ‘U.S. judge okays BP plea, $4 billion penalty in Gulf oil spill.’ 
Accessible at: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/01/29/uk-bp-spill-idUKBRE90S0WN20130129 
81 See: ‘Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill – Texas Becomes 5th Gulf State to File Lawsuit Against BP’, 
Accessible at: http://claimscomp.com/bp-transocean-are-sued-by-texas-over-2010-deepwater-
horizon-oil-spill/ 
82 BP’s overall corporate responsibility for the Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion and consequent loss 
of life, as well as environmental damage from the resulting oil spill has now been confirmed by findings 
in the final investigation report of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and 
Enforcement (BOEMRE) of the US Federal Ministry of the Interior into the disaster: Report Regarding 





Horizon spill and moreover, establishment of a formal institutional framework for 
management of compensation claims in the form of the GCCF, can be favourably 
contrasted with the decades-old struggle to engage Shell (and other IOCs) with their 
responsibility and liability for oil spills of in the Niger Delta. Many NGOs and 
commentators have drawn attention to the gulf of difference between efforts to clean-
up, remediate and compensate oil pollution damage in the recent Deepwater Horizon 
spill, as opposed to the continuing lack of such efforts over spills of similar overall 
magnitude in the Delta region over a greater length of time.83 For example, a local civil 
society organisation, the Human Rights Writers’ Association of Nigeria (HURIWA), 
not only applauded a landmark July 2010 Nigerian Federal High Court decision 
requiring SPDC pay the Ejama-Ebubu community the sum of N15.4 billion as special 
and punitive damages, but also advised the defaulting SPDC/Shell Nigeria to pay the 
damages in line with ‘international best practices’ (sic), drawing a lesson from the 
response of both the White House and Capitol Hill to the Deepwater Horizon disaster 
in the United States.84 Indeed, Milieudefensie, the Dutch chapter of the Friends of the 
Earth (FOE) environmental NGO network, has labelled the wide disparity between the 
                                                   
83 See: ‘Nigeria's agony dwarfs the Gulf oil spill. The US and Europe ignore it: The Deepwater Horizon 
disaster caused headlines around the world, yet the people who live in the Niger delta have had to live 
with environmental catastrophes for decades’, by John Vidal, environment editor, The Observer (UK) 
newspaper, Sunday 30 May 2010. 
84 See:  Davidson Iriekpen, ‘Oil Spill: Rights Group Hails Court Ruling against Shell’, 13 Jul 2010. 




BP and Shell responses to the Deepwater Horizon and Niger Delta spills, respectively, 
as ‘Shell's double standard.’85  
 
B. Erika oil tanker spill (Total/France/EU)  
A second example of voluntary corporate efforts at clean-up, remediation and 
compensation is evidenced from the Total oil company response following the Erika 
oil tanker spill off the French coast of Brittany.86  Total (as the oil cargo owner) and 
several ship (worthiness) classification societies were sued by French local authorities 
(and wildlife NGOs) for the clean-up and remediation costs and obtained an initial 
order for Total to pay out millions of Euros in clean-up and remediation costs. Faced 
with French government and public pressure, Total committed these sums in advance 
of its appeals against this initial order, and even when it won the appeal, did not take 
steps to recoup it outlay for the Erika clean-up. The facts and legal issues arising from 
the Erika incident are summarised below: 
 
On 12 December 1999, the 25-year old Maltese-registered oil tanker, Erika 
(19 666 gross tonnage) broke in two in the Bay of Biscay, some 60 nautical miles off 
the Brittany coast, western France releasing tonnes of heavy fuel oil into the Atlantic. 
All members of the crew were rescued by the French maritime rescue services. Some 
                                                   
85 See: ‘Royal Dutch Shell and its sustainability troubles: Background report to the Erratum of Shell's 
Annual Report 2010’, May 2011. This report was prepared on behalf of Milieudefensie (Friends of the 
Earth Netherlands) by Albert ten Kate, at pp.8-9. Accessible at: 
http://milieudefensie.nl/publicaties/rapporten/shell-background-report 
86 See: Erika Oil Tanker Break-up & Spill Incident, France, 12 December 1999, Report of the 




400 kilometres of shoreline were affected by oil.  Although the removal of the bulk of 
the oil from shorelines was completed quite rapidly, considerable secondary cleaning 
to remove residual contamination was still required in many areas. Operations began 
in spring 2001 and was mostly completed by November, 2001. More than 250 000 
tonnes of oily waste were collected from shorelines and temporarily stockpiled. 
Total SA, the French (major) oil company that owned the oil cargo of the Erika, 
engaged a contractor to deal with the disposal of the recovered waste and this 
operation was completed in December 2003. According to Total, immediately 
following the sinking, the company established the Atlantic Coast Task Force and 
spent more than €200 million to remedy the consequences of the oil spill through 
clean-up of hard-to-access areas of the coastline, pumping out the cargo remaining in 
the wreck and treatment of waste collected along the coast.87 
 
Initial compensation claims were settled by the international oil pollution 
compensation scheme established by States, as described above. The maximum 
amount of funds available for compensation under the applicable international tanker 
oil spill compensation scheme, namely, the 1992 Civil Liability Convention (CLC) and 
the 1992 Fund Convention, for the Erika incident was 135 million SDR (Special 
Drawing Rights), then equivalent to around €185 million. Both the French State and 
by Total SA also made undertakings to ‘stand last in the queue’ for the final redemption 
of oil spill clean-up and remediation costs.88 The different categories of claims allowed 
include the following headings: property damage and loss of tourism, damage to 
                                                   
87 See: ‘Erika: Measures taken by Total’, accessible from Total website at: 
http://www.total.com/en/about-total/special-reports/erika/measures-taken-by-total-922664.html 
88 IOPC Annual Report 2008, at p.78. 
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mariculture and oyster farming, shellfish gathering, fishing boats, fish and shellfish 
processors, and the costs of clean-up operations. Following the Erika and Prestige 
incidents, a Supplementary Fund Protocol to the 1992 Fund Convention was adopted 
in 2003 and entered into force in 2005, providing (for those IOPC Member States who 
chose to make additional contributions) a much higher limit of compensation 
(Supplementary Fund Protocol).89 
 
Aside from the clean-up and remediation costs incurred by Total in the immediate 
aftermath of the incident, both criminal charges and civil liability claims were also 
brought against Total in the Criminal Court in Paris. A number of claimants, including 
the French Government and several local authorities, joined the criminal proceedings 
as civil parties, claiming compensation totalling €400 million. In its judgment, 
delivered in January, 2008, the Criminal Court held the following four parties 
criminally liable for the offence of causing pollution, the representative of the 
shipowner (Tevere Shipping), the president of the management company 
(Panship Management and Services Srl), the classification society (RINA) and 
Total SA. The Paris Criminal Court of First Instance also recognised a) the civil right 
to compensation for damage to the environment for a local authority with special 
powers for the protection, management and conservation of a territory, as well as b) 
the judgment recognised the right of an environmental protection association to claim 
compensation, not only for the moral damage caused to the collective interests which 
it was its purpose to defend, but also for the damage to the environment which affected 
the collective interests which it had a statutory mission to safeguard. Regarding these 
                                                   




civil liabilities, the judgment held the four parties jointly and severally liable for the 
damage caused by the incident and awarded claimants in the proceedings 
compensation for economic losses, damage to the image of several regions and 
municipalities, moral damages and damages to the environment. Moreover, the 
judgment considered that Total SA could not avail itself of the benefit of the 
channelling provision of Article III.4(c) of the 1992 CLC,90 since the Court held it was 
not the charterer of the Erika, as the charterer was one of Total SA’s subsidiaries. The 
judgment considered that the other three parties, RINA in particular, were also not 
protected by the channelling provisions of the 1992 CLC, since they did not fall into 
the category of persons performing services for the ship under Article III.4(b).91  
 
The judgment concluded that French domestic law should be applied to the four 
parties and that therefore the four parties had civil liability for the consequences of the 
incident. The compensation awarded to the civil parties by the Criminal Court of 
First Instance was based on national law. The Court held that the 1992 Conventions 
did not deprive the civil parties of their right to obtain compensation for their damage 
in the Criminal Courts and awarded claimants in the proceedings compensation for 
economic loss, damage to the image of several regions and municipalities, moral 
                                                   
90 Article III.4 states, inter alia, that ‘no claim for compensation for pollution damage may be made 
against the owner otherwise than in accordance with this Convention. Subject to paragraph 5 of this 
Article, no claim for compensation for pollution damage under this Convention or otherwise may be 
made against: … (c) any charterer (how so ever described, including a bareboat charterer), manager or 
operator of the ship; …’ 
91 Article III.4 states, inter alia, that ‘… no claim for compensation for pollution damage under this 
Convention or otherwise may be made against: … (b) the pilot or any other person who, without being 
a member of the crew, performs services for the ship;…’ 
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damages and damages to the environment. The Court assessed the total damages in 
the amount of €192.8 million, including €153.9 million for the French State. The four 
parties held liable, including Total appealed against both the criminal and civil liability 
aspects of this judgment. However, without admitting its liability, Total SA 
nevertheless made voluntary payments in full and final settlement to the plaintiffs who 
accepted them, including to the French local and State governments, totalling €171.5 
million. Accordingly, Total estimates that it has spent over €370 million in total to 
clean-up, remediate and compensate for the damage resulting from the Erika incident. 
 
In its judgment on 30 March 2010, the Court of Appeal of Paris confirmed the 
judgment of the Criminal Court of First Instance, and held, respectively, the 
representative of the shipowner (Tevere Shipping), the president of the management 
company (Panship Management and Services Srl), the classification society (RINA) 
and Total SA all criminally liable for the offence of causing pollution. The 
Court of Appeal also confirmed the fines imposed by the Court of First Instance. The 
Court found, inter alia, that Total was imprudent in implementing its vessel vetting 
process and ordered Total to pay the original (criminal) fine imposed by the court of 
first instance, to the amount of €375,000. However, on the civil liability aspects of this 
case, the Court of Appeal reversed the finding of the Criminal Court of First Instance 
and decided that Total SA was ‘de facto’ the charterer of the Erika and could therefore 
benefit from the channelling provisions of Article III.4(c) of the 1992 CLC, since the 
imprudence committed in its vetting of the Erika could not be considered as having 
been committed with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with 
knowledge that such damage would probably result. The Court of Appeal thus held 
that Total SA did not incur civil liability for the consequent oil spill. However, the 
appellate court also decided that the voluntary payments made by Total SA to the civil 
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parties following the judgment of the Criminal Court of First Instance, were to be 
regarded as final payments which could not be recovered from the civil parties.92  
Significantly, Total did not contest this finding of the Court of Appeal.  
 
Comparing the two case studies presented in this Part, the preemptive and 
comprehensive responses of BP and Total in the Deepwater Horizon and Erika 
incidents can be contrasted with the lack of immediate response by SPDC/Shell 
(Nigeria) in the Niger Delta region. It also speak volumes for the clear disparity in the 




The present analysis concludes by highlighting legal developments heralding the 
accountability, responsibility, and even liability, for multinational oil companies that 
are implicated, involved or otherwise culpable in the breach of environmental 
standards: First, through the establishment by States of international civil liability 
schemes compelling individual legal persons involved in ultra-hazardous activities to 
contribute towards an established compensation fund. Relying on examples from the 
oil transport and nuclear power generation industries, it should be possible for States 
to expressly regulate by similar international agreements, liability for compensation 
for breaches of international law by private economic actors in many other fields of 
                                                   
92 See: ‘French oil company guilty but not responsible for ERIKA oil spill’, The Maritime Executive 





transnational economic activity. This is coupled with recent examples in the US and 
France of international ‘best practice’ in corporate responsibility on the part of BP and 
Total, respectively, for the clean-up, remediation and compensation of environmental 
and other damages arising from oil spills, whether legally required to do so or not.  
 
Finally, it remains to be seen whether the latest legal frontline that has been opened 
on this issue, namely, the cross-jurisdictional pursuit of the parent company, Royal 
Dutch Shell, through its subsidiary company, SPDC (Nigeria) in both Dutch and UK 
courts, will yield the requisite justice for the Niger Delta communities and its 
environment in the face of arguably decades of corporate misbehaviour in this region. 
Despite the withdrawal of the forum non conveniens doctrine in the Akpan and Bodo 
Community cases by The Hague district court and UK High Court, respectively, the 
continuing reluctance of both domestic courts (and international tribunals, such as the 
ITLOS) to ultimately extend international responsibility to private actors operating 
beyond their national jurisdictions is clear. In the same vein, the continuing absence 
of even suitable legal nomenclature denoting such responsibility for breaches of 
international norms by private actors is notable, in the sense that we still talk of ‘State’, 
responsibility for breaches of international law, as opposed to ‘corporate’ or 
‘individual’ responsibility, apart from the imputation of individual criminal 
responsibility for war crimes. Within this context, enforcing responsibility and liability 
on the part of private economic actors operating transnationally across different 
national jurisdictions for their breaches of international norms must still be 
considered to be an aspiration rather than the reality. 
